Policy makers in many countries earnestly debate the extent of powers that commercial banks should be allowed. By contrast, some economists declare such a debate futile. Commercial banks should be allowed all powers, and competition will ensure they will adopt only those ones that they can perform competently. In other words, they argue, so long as competition is not artificially restricted, efficient institutions will emerge. This paper shows that unrestricted competition does not necessarily lead to efficient institutions if the markets in which institutions compete are not naturally competitive. Therefore, the debate on what powers banks should have is relevant even from an efficiency point of view. More evidence is needed to inform policy makers, especially in developing countries.
2 See the excellent surveys in Benston(1990) , Saunders (1985) , and Walter (1985) . 3 Benston (1990) and Saunders (1985) argue that rational investors will take the bank's incentives into account and price the issue accordingly. Even though Congress passed the Glass Steagall Act (prohibiting commercial banks from underwriting corporate securities) to protect the 'naive' investor, economic theory (and the evidence) suggests that investors were not hurt by the activities of the banks. But as we argue later, this does not mean that conflicts of interest are costless; they hurt the issuer rather than the investor. 4 Kanatas and Qi (1994) .
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In recent years, there has been considerable interest, both in developed and nascent economies, as to whether commercial banks should have extended powers, i.e., whether commercial banks should be allowed to become universal banks providing a variety of additional services to customers. Some economists debate whether banks will be more, or less, efficient than existing producers when they provide a new service. For example, Saunders (1985) argues that commercial banks will be better at underwriting than investment banks (the existing producers of underwriting services) because they can realize the scope economies between lending and underwriting.
2 Others have focused on the costs of combining lending and underwriting. For instance, a bank's ability to certify a firm to public markets --a primary function of underwriting --is compromised by its concern about the value of its outstanding loan to the firm. So a firm will not be able to get as good a price for its public securities issues as if it were underwritten by an independent investment bank. 3 Given that there might be both costs and benefits, whether a universal bank is more efficient than specialized producers at providing the new service is an empirical issue.
Yet other economists question whether there is any need to debate the issue of institutional efficiency.
Using a logic that one could term Institutional Darwinism, they argue that if institutions are allowed to compete freely, efficient institutions will emerge. Reverting to our example of underwriting, if combining lending and underwriting under one roof creates significant conflicts of interest, banks will not be able to attract underwriting business away from independent investment banks. So they will simply not adopt underwriting powers. Absent externalities, the argument goes, there is no need to limit bank powers. It does not really matter if regulators can determine empirically whether conflicts of interest or economies of scope are more important, they should just let the banks decide. 4 The 'laissez faire' argument just enunciated assumes that a free market will necessarily lead to the emergence of efficient institutions. This paper argues that the laissez faire argument requires not only 2 unrestricted competition between institutions, but also competitive markets. If the markets in which institutions compete are not competitive, it is possible that it is a dominant strategy for institutions to choose inefficient structures.
While I consider a specific example, the point this paper makes is quite general. Consider two related services A and B that can be produced for customers either by specialized institutions or by a universal bank.
There is a natural sequence in which customers use the services -they first use A then some of them go on to use B. The services are not naturally competitive -I assume if producers were all specialized, they would get ex ante rents from offering each service. In this situation, let a producer have the ability to integrate forward from A to B. This is typically a situation in which it is argued that allowing integration (universal banking) would increase competition and make consumers better off.
I make one assumption to show that this need not be true. Since the services are related, let the integrated producer get an ex post rent in producing service B for a customer if it produced service A for him.
Such a rent may stem from some source of advantage the producer obtains over downstream producers, and it may not be entirely efficiency related. For instance, a producer who acquires an informational advantage over a customer generally captures ex post rents that exceed the cost of acquiring the information (see Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) for an application of this idea to banking). With this assumption, I can show that producers may integrate forward from A to B even if they are less efficient than specialized producers in producing service B.
The intuition is simple. In producing service A for a customer, the integrated producer obtains the possibility of an ex post rent in producing B. So long as this ex post rent is greater than the inefficiency the integrated producer brings to B, he can still drive away competition and capture the customer's downstream (i.e., B) business. Of course, ex ante, the customer will be aware of the possibility of capture. Will the inefficient integrated producer be able to survive in the ex ante competition with specialized producers for the customer's business? The answer could well be yes. In the ex ante competition for a customer, the specialized producer of A can agree to forego only its own rents but has no control over the rents the downstream producer will extract. By contrast, the integrated producer will be able to sacrifice both rents in an attempt to capture business. As a result, the integrated producer can capture a greater market share than the specialized producer 5 Illiquidity of the public markets is a clear externality that banks will not have to face up to. Another externality that is ignored is the effect of implicit and explicit deposit insurance. Finally, we do not consider the effect of new activities on perceptions of the safety and soundness of banks. These are not unimportant questions but they are not the focus of this paper.
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(and can even make a greater rent off each customer if the downstream rents are greater than its inefficiency).
Since integrated production is more profitable than being a specialized producer of A, all producers will become integrated. Downstream specialized producers of B will not get any customers (since they are all siphoned off by the integrated producer). As a result, there will be no specialized producers competing with the integrated producers. Unfettered by competition, the integrated producers can pass on the cost of their inefficiency to customers. In summary, all producers are integrated even though it is an inefficient organizational form, and even though there is competition ex ante among organizational forms (albeit in oligopolistic markets).
The assumptions behind the model are not wholly implausible. Service A could be lending and service B be underwriting. Firms typically borrow from banks when young and are underwritten in the public markets when mature. A bank that lends initially obtains a variety of sources of ex post advantage over a client even though its lack of specialization in the specific client's business, or its conflicts of interest, may imply it is not the best underwriter. Finally, perhaps because of the nature of the business and the regulations surrounding them, neither market is competitive.
In this setting, following the lines of the argument above, universal banks may deter the emergence of other specialized organizational forms. In comparison to using a sequence of specialized intermediaries, the all-in cost of being financed by the universal bank can be higher because the bank monopolizes all the firm's avenues of finance. Also, because the universal bank imposes additional costs on accessing the public markets, firms will be forced to rely more on bank loans. Public markets can be illiquid and small when banks adopt underwriting powers.
5
In fact , a government policy of first banning universal banks, allowing a variety of specialized banks to emerge, and then allowing the entry of universal banks may result in a more efficient and robust financial system. Sequencing of institutional regulations matters according to the model! Let us be careful about what this paper says. It simply suggests a plausible scenario where institutions 6 I will take the number of banks as given in much of what follows. Since entry into banking is almost universally regulated, it is not very realistic to assume free entry. The rationale for such regulation --providing franchise value, protecting against 'excessive' competition, compensation for financing government debt, etc. --seem largely exogenous to the issues I am investigating. See Rajan (1998) for a more detailed discussion of these issues.
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do not evolve in the socially optimal way. Whether the conditions do, in fact, apply is an empirical question which can be answered in different ways depending on an economy's history and current state of development.
For example, if underwriting markets are competitive, commercial banks will be forced to internalize the costs of the structure they choose. In this case, it does not really matter if regulators know whether commercial banks are better at underwriting than independent investment banks, they can rely on the commercial banks to make the right decision about whether to enter the business. But politicians and regulators appear to advocate extending bank powers to services and economies whose markets do not have the appearance of being competitive, with the intent of making them more competitive. This paper indicates caution in precisely these situations, and suggests more empirical work to determine what kinds of bank powers --taking deposits, making loans, holding equity in firms, underwriting, making markets, managing trust funds, etc. --can reasonably and efficiently be combined.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section I, I describe the model and solve it in section II. In section III, I examine the empirical evidence for the assumptions and conclusions of the model, after which I conclude with suggestions for future research.
I. The Model.
Bank Finance.
Consider a risk neutral Hotelling world where, at date 0, a continuum of start-up firms are uniformly distributed on a circle with perimeter unity. The density is unity along the circle. Each firm has to borrow seed capital of $1. I assume that in the early stages of a firm's life, only those firms whose assets have substantial liquidation value get financing. This is because future cash flows are quite uncertain. Banks specialize in understanding the liquidation values of the firm's assets so that the firm has to go to a bank to obtain financing (see also Diamond and Rajan (1997) ). This initial necessity for reliance on banks turns out to be very important in the model. The discount rate is zero. There are n banks located at equidistant points on the unit circle. 6 The 7 Diamond (1991) shows that banks can inefficiently liquidate too many viable projects. Renegotiation is constrained by both asymmetric information and the firm's inability to transfer all the surplus from a project to the bank. Diamond shows that the firm is better off if it takes on some arm's length financing, because this reduces the extent of inefficient liquidation. In Rajan (1992) , the bank obtains an informational monopoly over the firm because of the close ties it has with it. This enables it to extract some of the surplus from projects, thus distorting the firm's investment incentives. Arm's length financing constrains the bank's rents and reduces distortions. So long as the benefits of bank control are not too high --which would be true for mature firms --borrowing from arm's length or public sources may be more efficient than borrowing from the bank. 5 excess cost to a firm of borrowing from a bank depends on the excess interest rate charged, r, and the distance from the firm to the bank. The cost of transportation per unit of distance is t. This could be the actual transactions cost of doing business with a distant bank. The transportation cost could also represent the premium a firm has to pay on a loan from a bank because of its informational or geographical distance from the bank. For instance, a bank manager in a small town knows a lot about liquidation values (second best uses of assets) for firms in that town, but very little about values in the next town.
Once future cash flow potential has become well established, the firm is ready to tap the public markets. Let date 1 be the event time when future cash flows are well established (for different firms this may correspond to different calender times). At this point outside investors can extract repayment by threatening the cash flows, and do not necessarily have to be able to liquidate assets for a lot (see Hart and Moore (1994) ).
Not only is the bank not needed for future financing, its continuing financing may be positively harmful. In fact, I assume that there is a deadweight cost, ?w L , to the firm of continuing to rely on the bank for funding beyond the first period.
A rationale for this assumption is that for mature firms, bank debt can be costlier than debt from more arm's length or long term sources. This follows from Diamond (1991) and Rajan (1992) . Both papers argue that a bank influences a firm's choice of investments by controlling the flow of finance to it. The firm benefits from such control at an early stage because it can commit to taking the right kind of projects, thus lowering its cost of capital. However, if a firm takes on too much bank debt, or persists with the same level of bank debt when it is mature, such control becomes excessive, leading to inefficiency.
7 Evidence for these arguments is found, for example, in Houston and James (1996) ).
Financing from the public markets.
In order to be able to issue securities to the public investor, a firm's future cash flow potential has to . What I have in mind is that a small firm deciding to tap the markets for the first time does not have a wide choice set for investment banker. There are only a few investment banks that specialize in the industry, and even fewer who have any expertise with small firms, or are willing to take them on. In fact, there is only one that understands the firm's needs perfectly. So in figure   1 , the firm F is distance x from commercial bank B and 1/n -x from another commercial bank A, and it is next to an investment bank I that is on the investment banking circle.
Unlike bank loans which can be contracted at any time, the process of making a public issue is less flexible. The firm has to issue securities and repay bank debt by date 1 + 3e (where e is a short period of time) so as to not incur bank interest charges in the second period or the deadweight costs of bank debt ?w L . So at date 1, the firm has to decide whether to start the process of issuing public securities. It has to get an underwriter to verify the size of expected cash flows to the public. To initiate this process, at date 1 it asks potential underwriters to prepare a preliminary proposal which specifies the underwriting fee (or spread) the underwriter will charge. The cost of preparing this proposal is c P and has to be incurred at date 1 + e. From the firm's point of view, the preliminary proposal enables it to gauge the underwriter's intentions, competitiveness, and understanding of its business. 8 In practice, distribution of securities is also a major function of the underwriter. While a universal bank may be able to distribute securities more easily because it has a network of depositors, I will not focus on this in what follows.
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The proposals are due at date 1 + 2e. The firm asks all those who submit serious proposals (those who invest the cost c P ) to bid for its business. Once the firm accepts a bid, it is committed to the public issue and cannot then turn around and contract a bank loan. The chosen underwriter then invests an additional c D which is the cost of a due diligence investigation of the firm's past affairs and future plans. Think of this as the cost of verifying the future cash flows through audits and preparing a detailed public prospectus. The verification is required for legal purposes and need not uncover new information. Finally, I assume that any costs, once invested, cannot be recovered. So the total cost of taking the firm to the market is c P + c D . In order that firms find it cheaper to issue securities than to borrow at date 1, I assume that
The issue is underwritten and distributed at date 1 + 3e. This is a somewhat stylized and stripped down description of the underwriting process that small firms face in the United States.
The links between lending and underwriting.
The information generated from the lending process is on liquidation values. This is very different from the information needed to verify future cash flows in order to underwrite the firm. So the house bank (the universal bank which has lent at date 0 to the firm) has no cost advantage in verifying the information necessary to take the firm to market. But I assume that it has a timing advantage in that it can anticipate the event date 1 when the firm has the potential to go to the market. Furthermore, it has access to the firm's management and its records. So once the firm's management decides to go through the underwriting route, the house bank can invest up to c P + c D before date 1 + e. By contrast, an independent investment bank or another universal bank can only invest c P . I will show shortly, this timing advantage coupled with the house bank's access is enough to give it the power to establish an ex post monopoly.
I want to determine whether a commercial bank will choose to underwrite despite being less efficient at it. So I assume that the costs of a commercial bank underwriting its client firm exceed the benefit. What might these costs be? The cost attributed to conflicts of interest has received considerable empirical support (see the evidence discussed later). The objective of underwriting is to certify firms to the market. 8 As a result firm on as a client, it has an incentive to promote the issue as much as possible. All I am arguing is that conflicts of interest may potentially be larger when a bank has a prior relationship with the firm, is in a possible end-game situation, and has an interest in the proceeds of the issue. In a earlier version of this paper, I show that the ability of the house bank to communicate firm quality to investors decreases monotonically in the size of conflicts of interest. Furthermore, I show in the working paper version that legal penalties for miscertifying (of the sort described by Hughes and Thakor (1992) ) do not necessarily improve the accuracy of certification. These results are available from the author on request. Finally, Kanatas and Qi (1994) show that reputation does not necessarily resolve these problems.
11 There may be other costs (or benefits) of combining lending and underwriting. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) point out that if the same entity monitors the firm repeatedly (universal banking), it may ensure that few bad firms get funded, but in the process may turn away too many good firms. By contrast, monitoring by independent entities (specialized banking) will increase the number of bad firms that get funded but reduce the number of good firms that get turned away. As Sah and Stiglitz argue, which system is more efficient depends on the nature of information about firms in the economy. 8 of its investigation the house bank is better informed than the public. But if the firm is in a poor position, the house bank has an incentive to overstate the quality of the issue to ensure that the issue succeeds. This is because the success of the issue makes it more likely that the firm will survive to repay its loans. 9 Of course, rational investors will be cognizant of these incentives and will discount the price of the securities issued appropriately. But in general, because the house bank has a conflict of interest, 10 the firm will not be able to issue as much or invest as much as it would if the underwriter were more impartial. Conflicts of interest have a cost and they impinge on the firm being underwritten. 11 I assume these costs are ?w U if the house bank underwrites the issue.
There is no reason that these costs be related to the bank's lending activities. Note that the universal bank does not have an explicit place on the underwriting circle vis a vis the closest investment bank. It may be that the bank is not as conversant with the firm's underwriting needs as the closest specialized investment bank.. If so, we could assume that ?w U includes any transportation cost of using the universal bank as underwriter.
The Timing.
To summarize the timing discussed so far: To anticipate the result, I will show that the universal bank structure may drive out other structures even though the cost of financing arranged by a sequence of a specialized commercial bank and an independent underwriter is lower. To show this, I solve the model using backward induction. First, I analyze the firm's choice between bank debt and public finance at date 1. This will depend on whether it borrowed from a universal bank or a specialized commercial bank at date 0. I also determine the equilibrium loan rates and underwriting fees charged. At date 0, the firm's choice of who to borrow from will depend on what it expects will happen at date 1, and the kinds of banks that exist. Finally, I solve for the kinds of banks that will arise in equilibrium when there are no regulations limiting bank powers, i.e., when universal banking is permitted.
II. Solving for the equilibrium.
Choice of financing at date 1.
The actual choice of source (public debt or bank loan) and the choice of intermediary (house bank, another universal bank, a specialized commercial bank or investment bank) at date 1 depends on how the firm financed at date 0. First consider the case when the firm borrows from a specialized commercial bank at date 12 Would changes in the assumed contracting environment change the results? For example, consider the possibility of renegotiation after the bidding at date 1+2e. This has no impact; the house bank has a shot at being selected only if it has sunk more than ?w U , otherwise the investment bank will undercut its bid. But because its investment is nontransferable, the house bank is now more efficient than the investment bank and renegotiation has no bite.
Could the firm pay the investment bank to do due diligence? This again has no effect in our model if it is hard for courts to determine whether the investment bank indeed performed the due diligence, absent its actually underwriting the firm. If the condition in lemma 1 holds, the investment bank knows it has no chance of winning at
0.
Choice of underwriter at date 1 if a specialized bank lends at date 0.
If the firm has borrowed from a specialized commercial bank at date 0, we know from (1) that it is efficient for the firm to choose the closest specialized investment bank to underwrite the public issue at date 1. The fee this underwriter can charge will be limited both by the cost of borrowing from the nearest commercial bank and the cost of being underwritten by a more distant investment bank. The fee is
Note from (1) that the first term is greater than the cost of investigation (as is obviously the second term because t I /n I >0), so the investment bank will always underwrite.
The choice of underwriter if a universal bank lends at date 0.
Consider now the case where the firm has borrowed from a universal bank at date 0 and wants to make a public issue at date 1. If the firm asks for proposals from potential underwriters at date 1, they will start gathering material to make the preliminary proposal. At most two underwriters will respond, the house bank (the universal bank the firm has borrowed from at date 0) and the closest investment bank. The house bank has prior access to firm records. It is easy to show that Proof: See Appendix.
In a market with irreversible fixed investments, an entity who has a first mover advantage in making investments can obtain a monopoly. But if the house bank's underwriting inefficiency, ?w U , is high, the first mover advantage is dissipated. Hence, lemma 1. While the results seem knife-edged, the point is easily generalized. date 1+2e. It will pretend to do the due diligence, submit a meaningless bid, and collect the fee from the firm. A fee contingent on its being selected to underwrite will also not work. In the model, either the house bank will not bid, in which case the investment bank will win on its own volition, or the investment bank has no chance of winning so that contingent fees are meaningless. If the firm decides to forego the public issue, it has access only to the loan market. The distance between commercial banks is 1/n. Consider figure 1. Let the house bank be at B in figure 1, i.e., at distance
x from the firm. Given the transportation cost t, the firm will go to the nearest bank and will be charged an excess interest rate which makes it indifferent between borrowing there and borrowing from next nearest bank.
So if , the firm, if it chooses to borrow, will borrow from the house bank and pay an excess
interest rate r(x) -over and above the cost of capital -such that So the house bank will charge an excess interest rate of
Recall that borrowing from the bank at date 1 involves the transportation cost xt and the additional deadweight cost of ?w L . So the total excess cost to the firm of borrowing from the house bank is then 2.1.3. The firm's choice of financing at date 1 if it borrows from a universal bank at date 0.
Now that I have determined the excess cost of borrowing at date 1, I can determine the underwriting fee the house bank will charge, and the choice between bank debt and public debt. Let F be the excess fee that the house bank charges in the proposal for underwriting (over and above c P + c D ). Because the house bank has 13 Recall that the house bank's ability to deter other investment banks is contingent on it being profitable for the house bank to underwrite if the firm does ask for proposals. It is profitable for the house bank to deter others if F in (7) is greater than zero. This is always true if ? UL /t # 1/2n.
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deterred all potential underwriters, the only alternative to a public issue is a bank loan. The excess cost of borrowing from a competing commercial bank then limits the fee the house bank can charge and still get the firm's underwriting business. So
The term on the left hand side is the excess cost to the firm of issuing public debt underwritten by the house bank. This includes the cost of conflicts of interest ?w U . Define 
Proof: Follows directly from (7).
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Compare the outcome here with the outcome when the firm borrows from a specialized commercial bank at date 0. Note that the right hand side of (7) is greater than the first term in square brackets in (2), so the feeinclusive cost to the firm of issuing at date 1 when it borrows from a specialized bank at date 0, is always less than if it were captured by its house bank. This is because while the house bank controls the cheapest alternative source of finance at date 1, the specialized investment bank does not.
This lemma then gives a new perspective on the industrial organization implications of extending bank powers to underwriting. Bank finance and public finance are primarily substitutes. In order to underwrite, an 14 This is not to say that the fee is higher. If the house bank is sufficiently inefficient at underwriting, it may have to charge a lower fee in order to attract the firm. Also, our suggestion that the house bank can make higher (ex post) profits stems from our view that bank finance and public finance are substitutes. This contrasts with the previous literature which views them as essentially independent or complementary goods produced by the house bank. The main issue it then addresses is tying --whether the house bank can utilize the leverage gained from being a monopolistic
intermediary needs access to information. A specialized commercial bank cannot deter others from acquiring the information needed to underwrite. But the house bank can, because its prior lending relationship with the firm enables it to credibly threaten to acquire the relevant information before any competitor, and then undercut it. The house bank is then in a similar position to a producer in a competitive market who has captured a crucial input that competitors need in order to produce. The house bank can now charge monopoly prices, unfettered by competition from investment banks.
In what follows, to simplify the exposition, I assume that at least some firms who are closer to the universal bank than to a competitor bank should be underwritten at date 1.
This imposes an upper bound on the inefficiency of the house bank which may be looser or tighter than (3).
It is easy to see that the three parameter assumptions I have made, (1), (3), and (8) are not mutually inconsistent.
Outcome Relative to First Best.
The first best outcome is for a firm to issue public debt at date 1 through an independent underwriter if the excess cost of borrowing from a bank at date 1, xt + ?w L , exceeds the excess cost of underwriting, c P + c D . From (1), it follows that all firms should issue. We can summarize our findings thus far as
Corollary 1: Fewer firms issue public debt when they borrow at date 0 from a universal bank than in the first best outcome or when they borrow from a specialized commercial bank at date 0. The date-1 all-in cost of issuing public debt is always higher when the firm borrows from a universal bank at date 0.
Because the house bank is inefficient at underwriting, it will steer the firm away from a public issue.
As a result, there will be fewer public issues in a system dominated by universal banks. Also, the house bank controls the firm's access to both bank loan and public debt markets. As a result, the all-in cost of a public issue is always higher when done through the house bank. 14 lender to coerce the firm into using it for underwriting too. Benston (1990) dismisses this on Chicago School grounds; leverage from lending enables the house bank to extract at most only one monopoly profit from the firm, so it gains nothing from coercion. Clearly, the focus on tying neglects the possibility that in a specialized system, competition between the investment bank and commercial bank may have been keeping down even that single (ex post) monopoly profit. Furthermore, I will show that the inefficiency of competitors may allow the ex post rents to be converted to ex ante profits.
Having determined what happens at date 1, I now step back to date 0. What excess interest rate will a universal bank have to charge at date 0 to attract the firms in its neighbourhood? What excess interest rate will a specialized bank be able to charge? What will their respective profits be? Will any bank want to be universal if commercial banks are allowed to underwrite?
2.2. Excess interest rates, ex ante profits and credit market structure at date 0.
Clearly, the excess interest rate a bank can charge at date 0 depends on its structure (specialized or universal), the distance a firm is from it, and the structure of its competitors. I can solve for the symmetric Nash equilibrium structure adopted by the banks, after calculating the ex ante profits in the following situations:
1. A specialized bank is surrounded by specialized banks.
A universal bank is surrounded by universal banks.
3. A specialized bank is surrounded by universal banks.
4. A universal bank is surrounded by specialized banks.
A specialized bank is surrounded by specialized banks.
Let the bank at B in figure 1 be specialized, and let it be surrounded by specialized banks. As discussed above, the firm always issues at date 1. Let us determine the all-in cost of financing at date 0. The underwriting fee at date 1 will be determined as in 2.1.0. The underwriting fee will be the same regardless of who lends at date 0. Thus the excess interest rate at date 0 will be determined solely by competition over the one-period loan and will be which is the one-period excess rate. From symmetry, each bank's market share will be 1/2n on each side.
A universal bank is surrounded by universal banks.
Consider now a universal bank at B surrounded by universal banks. Because all banks are symmetric, each bank's market share will again be 1/2n. What determines the profits the universal bank makes? The alternative to borrowing from the nearest universal bank B is to borrow from the more distant universal bank, A, at date 0. Once the firm borrows from universal bank A, it does not have the ability to choose an alternative underwriter. But the firm always has the alternative at date 1 of returning to the nearest universal bank B to borrow and paying the all in excess cost of (1/n -x)t+ ?w L . 15 So, if the more distant universal bank A pares its margin to the bone, the most attractive two period excess cost of financing it can offer at date 0 is (1/n -
. But for any firm that is further than 1/2n to the universal bank at A, we know from (8) that (1/n-x)t+ ?w L > c P +c D +?w U. So the universal bank B faces a competitor who can charge, at minimum, (1/n -x)t + c P +c D +?w U to firms that are within a distance 1/2n from B. It then follows that Comparing (10) and (11) with (9), it is easily seen that the universal banks make more off their nearest clients than specialized banks. Intuitively, competing universal banks will underwrite inefficiently at date 1. This limits their ability to charge a low all-in cost at date 0, and provides an umbrella under which the house bank can make an excess rent off its nearest customers. Universal banks in an economy with only universal banks enjoy the same market share at date 0 as specialized banks would in an economy with only specialized banks but make greater profits off their nearest clients. So they make greater profits overall. (11), (12), and (13) that a specialized bank at B, surrounded by universal banks charges a (weakly) lower excess interest rate off each customer than if it were a universal bank in the same location. Again, the intuition is that the oligopolistic rents that the downstream investment bank will make forces the specialized bank to cut its margins in order to retain clients.
A specialized bank surrounded by universal banks.
As a result, not only is its market share lower, but its profits per client are also lower. It is therefore clear that if the specialized bank thinks it will be surrounded by universal banks and ?w U <t I /n I , it will want to become universal itself. Of course, if ?w U $t I /n I , the specialized bank will have greater market share and charge greater excess interest than a universal bank at the same location, and it will have no incentive to become universal. The final step before determining the equilibrium is to examine profits when a universal bank is surrounded by specialized banks.
A universal bank is surrounded by specialized banks.
It is easy now to see what would happen if a universal bank at B were surrounded by specialized banks. 16 A closely related paper is Boot and Thakor (1997) who find that a universal bank's incentive to innovate to reduce the costs of access to public markets is lower than a specialized investment bank's incentives. Intuitively, by innovating, universal banks cannibalize lending business. A related result could be obtained in my model when I recognize that the universal bank's ability to capture the firm and extract rents depends on the inefficiency it imposes being lower than the costs of gathering information. If the costs of gathering information become small, the universal bank's ex post
First, from the discussion above, the universal bank's market share will go up relative to if it were a specialized bank when ?w U < t I /n I . Second, it is easy to show that the universal bank's profit margins are which are higher than its margins as a specialized bank when ?w U < t I /n I . Taken together, the universal bank surrounded by specialist banks will be more profitable than a specialist bank in the same spot.
Ex ante Choice of Structure.
It follows that when ?w U < t I /n I , we have
Proposition 1: It is a dominant strategy for all banks to adopt a universal banking structure.
Note that all banks adopt a structure which is inefficient. I summarize the intuition for this result. A specialized commercial bank cannot pass on to client firms the margins that the date 1 downstream underwriter (a specialized investment bank or another universal bank) will realize. So relative to a universal bank at the same location, it cannot compete as fiercely, and has lower market share. It also has lower profits because it has to compensate for the rents the downstream investment bank extracts. So it is a dominated strategy for a bank to be specialized. It is thus possible that institutions adopt extended powers even though they are not the least cost producer because the oligopolistic markets for these powers prevent the banks from facing up to their inefficiencies. 16 Because client firms pay for the inefficiencies, institutions may have no individual or collective monopoly vanishes and so do its ex ante rents. Thus universal banks will have an incentive to retard innovation in underwriting (or maintain high entry barriers). 17 The result here is different from the standard one that monopolies are inefficient because they ration quantities. In the standard result, monopolies would not willfully adopt high cost technologies. The problem here is that the bank adopts a high cost structure (universal banking) because that is the only way it can appropriate rents.
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incentive to become efficient.
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Proposition 1 was derived under the assumption that ?w U < t I /n I so that the downstream underwriter extracted oligopoly rents that exceeded the universal bank's underwriting inefficiency. Alternatively, underwriting may be more competitive so that this inequality is reversed. There is no change in the analysis for the case when a bank is surrounded by banks with similar structures. But now, when the universal bank is surrounded by specialized banks, it has a lower market share than in the symmetric case. Also it makes lower profits that it would if it were specialized. The reason is that now the specialized commercial bank in combination with the competitive, and efficient, date 1 underwriter is both the most efficient producer and can pass on the cost savings to consumers. In a sense, the essential difference from the case discussed above is that, now, the specialized commercial bank controls more of the overall margin the firm pays (because very little of the overall margin goes to downstream underwriters) and can compete effectively with the universal bank.
This explains why the universal bank's market share is lower. In addition, the firm does not suffer any deadweight cost in underwriting when it uses the nearest specialized investment bank to underwrite securities at date 1. So the universal bank has to reduce its margins for all its clients to compensate. The two effects, ensure that the universal bank more than internalizes the costs of its inefficiency, and makes lower profits than a specialized bank at the same location. So now proposition 1 will be reversed and we get Proposition 2: The unique equilibrium is that all commercial banks adopt a specialized structure.
Thus whether inefficient universal banks drive out specialized banks or not turns on how competitive the downstream underwriting market is expected to be. While this may be determined by technology (the size of the fixed costs of set up relative to the expected profits) or by regulations on entry, much of the competitiveness of the investment banking industry may be endogenous.
For example, let the fixed costs of setting up a specialized investment bank be positive but small. Then 19 absent other effects, there will be substantial entry into investment banking and it will be close to competitive.
However, the possibility that universal banks can enter may alter beliefs and change the equilibrium.
Specifically, if a potential specialized entrant into investment banking believes that the economy will only have universal banks, it knows that it will get no business since universal banks will capture all clients upstream. As a result it may not enter. Moreover, anticipating an uncompetitive investment banking sector, specialized commercial banks know that they will not make as much as universal banks, and will prefer becoming universal.
Therefore, even if investment banking is intrinsically quite competitive (entry costs are low), it is possible to get an equilibrium where universal banks foreclose the market and deter entry.
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By contrast, if commercial banks are prohibited from entering investment banking, it could well be that entry takes place in investment banking till the technological limit is reached. Allowing universal banking at this point, after specialized upstream and downstream institutions are well established, may be efficient in that universal banks will emerge only if they can provide finance at lower cost (or rent) than specialized banks.
Before I examine the empirical evidence for my assumptions and conclusions, I examine how my results depend on the assumptions.
Relaxing the assumptions.
Contracts.
It would seem that much of the problem is driven by the firm's inability to refuse to use the house bank as an underwriter. Obviously, the 'investment race' model I have used is a metaphor for the fact that inside financiers have an advantage relative to outside financiers which may be unrelated to their financing ability.
19 20 Another problem with such contracts is that outsiders may wonder at the information the house bank has about the firm that prompts it to agree to the contract.
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But this does raise the following question; can the firm contractually precommit to not using the house bank as underwriter? If so, it would make economic sense to allow each firm to contractually generate the system (universal or specialized banking) that suits it best. Unfortunately, the firm cannot unilaterally and credibly claim that it will not use the house bank to underwrite, because the firm will always accept the best offer ex post.
It is possible for the firm and the house bank to write a contract that penalizes the latter if it bids for, or wins, the firm's underwriting business. But such contracts can be torn up by mutual understanding and this destroys their commitment value. For instance, the house bank can sign such a contract but also pre-emptively gather information. It can then credibly threaten not to bid unless the contract is torn up. Because the firm is better off at this point accepting the house bank's offer, the contract is torn up. In the absence of incorruptible third parties who can enforce such contracts, they have no value. 
Entry and Exit.
If there is free entry into commercial banking, then banks would enter until the fixed costs of entry just equaled the profits. So long as the fixed costs of setting up a bank are not too small so that n is not too large, all our results would still hold.
Finally, I do not suggest that it is impossible to get a variety of bank structures (universal and specialized) in equilibrium. Differences in the size of the loan market each bank faces, and differences in the degree of competition in them, or differences in the kinds of client firms a bank has would ensure a variety of choices. Nevertheless the forces I have identified would still be a factor in determining equilibrium structure choice.
Empirical evidence.
This paper argues that the fact that a certain kind of institution exists is not evidence that it is efficient.
The nature of competition may be such that the rents associated with an inefficient structure outweigh the cost of inefficiency. The theory simply suggests a possibility. The model shows a number of conditions are necessary in order that even a plausible case be made for a social planner to restrict the power of banks to underwrite (and, 21 The Act, among other things, prohibited commercial banks from underwriting corporate securities either directly or through affiliates. 22 Their finding does not rule out the possibility that there are scope economies in combining businesses stemming from other sources. For instance, less capital may be needed if two businesses are conducted by the same firm, than if they are conducted by separate firms. In fact, the focus on larger issues that Kroszner and Rajan find could partly be explained by the fact that the banks could afford to take on more distribution risk with the same capital base.
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of course, it is quite possible that regulators, while intervening, would increase the rents and the inefficiency that are the source of the market failure). Evidence for (or against) the existence of these conditions is perhaps more easy to obtain than evidence for the conclusions of the model. Some economists (Hayes and Spence (1983) , and Pugel and White (1985) ) have argued that even in the extremely competitive U.S. financial sector, investment banks have market power. More recently, Cosimano and McDonald (1998) provide evidence of market power at the level of individual commercial banks. Finally, Petersen and Rajan (1995) report that in a sample of small firms, over half are within 2 miles of their primary lending institution. Taken together, this evidence suggests a "transportation costs" model of the financial sector is not implausible.
I have stressed conflicts of interest as one source of potential inefficiency of universal banks. There could be others --for example, the possibility that the universal bank would inflict its services on the client firm even though it is not the best at providing them. But are conflicts of interest economically important? Kroszner and Rajan (1994) compare the underwriting activities of commercial banks and independent investment banks (investment banks without a lending arm) in the United States before the Glass Steagall Act of 1933.
21 As predicted by the theory, and contrary to the allegations that prompted the Act, they do not find that investors were systematically fooled by the banks. This evidence has since been confirmed by Ang and Richardson (1992) and Puri (1993) . But this does not mean that there is no evidence of conflicts of interest. Kroszner and Rajan find that relative to comparable investment banks, the securities affiliates of commercial banks underwrote safer securities (debt rather than equity) for older, larger, and relatively less indebted firms. Kroszner and Rajan argue that these activities are consistent with the market discounting the risky issues underwritten by commercial banks because of the potential for conflicts of interest, and forcing banks to move to safer issues. Because commercial banks did not typically bring junior issues like equity, or small and risky firms, to market, Kroszner and Rajan's findings indicate that any scope economies in information may be relatively unimportant.
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23 There is also anecdotal evidence on the importance of conflicts of interest in a somewhat different context. For instance, in describing the lessons from Mexico's privatization program in the late 1980s, the administrator in charge of it claimed that "Another problem emerged when I selected the banks as our sales agents, and these very institutions were the main creditors of the enterprises being sold. Naturally, there was a conflict of interest for the banks, and selling the company became less important for them than recovering their credit. ", Wall Street Journal, May 15, 1992. 
Further evidence of potential conflicts when activities are combined emerges when Kroszner and Rajan (1997) examine the different structures through which commercial banks underwrote. Banks could underwrite either through separately capitalized affiliates or directly through in-house departments. Presumably the potential for conflicts of interest, or any scope economies in information gathering, should be higher in the latter structure. Kroszner and Rajan find that issues underwritten by departments were discounted more (had higher yields) than comparable issues underwritten by affiliates. Packer (1994) examines initial public offerings in Japan of firms in which venture capitalists have substantial stakes. He finds that, in general, a higher stake owned by the venture capitalist is correlated with lower underpricing of the offering. This suggests that venture capitalists play some kind of certification function. However, issues underwritten by an investment bank in which its own venture capital affiliate has a significant stake tend to be underpriced significantly more than the average issue (the effect is economically important also).
Consistent with Kroszner and Rajan's findings, fears of conflicts of interest tend to outweigh any benefits from more informed certification when the investment bank has an interest in the proceeds of the issue. All these studies suggest that universal banks are not particularly effective at underwriting informationally sensitive issues.
23 There are, however, studies that find the opposite -commercial banks play a valuable certification role while underwriting (Puri (1996) , Gande, Puri, Saunders, Walter (1997) ) or they have play a certification role but conflicts of interest demonstrate themselves in other ways (Ber, Yafeh and Yosha (1998) ). More work is clearly needed.
Another important assumption/prediction of the model is that the existence of a prior lending relationship enables the universal bank to capture a firm's future financing business. Peach (1941) th , 1991) on the underwriting activities of J.P. Morgan's securities affiliate: " Even worse [than the advantages banks possess from deposit insurance] Wall Streeters contend, is the perhaps-illegal strong-arm that some banking companies put on corporate borrowers to lead and co-manage their stock issues. They say they know of implicit, and sometimes explicit, suggestions that a company wanting consideration of a loan or better terms should give the bank's securities affiliate a manager role in underwriting deals."
In an attempt to deal with this, the Banking Bill of 1991 that was ultimately not passed by the U.S. Congress explicitly forbid 'bank lending arrangements 60 days before or 90 days after a securities offering managed by a bank's affiliate unless rigorous provisions were met, including a written statement from the company that it was not coerced.' 25 A statement by the Chairman of Deutsche Bank as to why it is always picked to lead manage issues by Daimler Benz is revealing about a source of tie-in --information asymmetries --that I have alluded to: "... of course we must lead manage that... because if we didn't, the world would say 'Daimler is cross with us'. That wouldn't be good for Daimler-Benz's business, as much as it is not good for us." 23 business including underwriting that firms generate. 24 There is more direct evidence from other countries. Edwards and Fischer (1994, p 118) There is mixed evidence that universal banks may reduce financing efficiency. Calomiris (1992) argues that American industry evolved at a slower, and less capital intensive rate than did German industry around the turn of this century, and he attributes the difference to the positive effect of German universal banks. By 26 Until recently, banks in Japan did not have the power to underwrite corporate securities. So this evidence relates to our more general point about extending bank powers than our specific point about combining lending and underwriting. 27 There is some further anecdotal evidence on Germany. The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1994, states that: "Corporations, encouraged by board members from the big banks, often borrow directly from banks rather than issuing stock or bonds, although those alternatives are usually less expensive. The total capitalization of the German stock market is only 27% of the country's gross domestic product, compared with 61% in the U.S., 62% in Japan, and 143% in the U.K.. As a result, the biggest German banks increasingly are being blamed for crimping the growth of the country's capital markets. The relative lack of competition means German companies often pay more than their counterparts abroad to borrow money or issue stock. This in turn could hurt Germany's industrial base by making expansion more expensive than it is in other countries." 24 contrast, Weinstein and Yafeh (1994) study the effects of close bank ties on firm performance in Japan.
26 They find that firms with close ties to a bank have not enjoyed higher profits despite their preferential access to capital. These firms pay a higher than average interest rate on debt (a finding anticipated by Caves and Uekasa (1976) ). Finally, firms with a main bank suffered from low profitability and growth rates even as early as the 1960s. They conclude that their evidence casts doubt on 'the existence of growth-inducing and other beneficial effects of universal banking.'
There seems to be some evidence that powerful commercial banks retard the growth of public markets.
There were only 25 initial public offerings on the German stock market between 1959 and 1979. By comparison, Loughran and Ritter (1993) report 269 initial public offerings in the United States in 1960 alone. 27 Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) report the onerous requirements that firms in Japan had to satisfy in order to issue public debt before the liberalizations during the 1980s. La Porta et al. (1996) show that bank dominated economies typically have poorer disclosure requirements that economies with well developed markets. Taken together, this evidence is certainly suggestive of a tension between extending banking powers and expanding the efficiency of public markets.
Finally, commercial banks and investment banks themselves recognize the problems with combining lending and underwriting. Kroszner and Rajan (1997) note that some banks recognized that an internal department which underwrote and distributed securities could compromise the integrity of their investment advice, and such institutions proudly advertised that they did not have such a department. Kroszner and Rajan show that over the 1920s, commercial banks moved predominantly to underwriting securities through an arm's length affiliate structure, and away from using in-house departments. This suggests that the affiliate form may 25 have been more efficient, perhaps because it reduced the possibility of conflicts of interest. Interestingly enough, the slowest to adopt the affiliate --instead of department --structure were small state chartered banks even though, as Peach (1941, p81) suggests, the costs of setting up an affiliate were minor. One explanation consistent with our model is that these were the banks who enjoyed the most local monopoly power in lending, and were willing to live with an inefficient structure provided it enabled them to control more easily the underwriting decisions of their client firms.
This section has presented evidence from a variety of sources consistent with the assumptions and conclusions of our model. Most of this evidence is peripheral. But taken together with the theoretical foundations I have provided, it suggests that the case for extending bank powers to underwriting merits further investigation, not so much in countries with competitive financial systems where banks can self select efficient structures but in countries with nascent institutions or concentrated markets where one cannot be so sanguine.
Conclusion
While I have made our point in the context of extending bank powers to underwriting, I could well have made it in the context of other activities. To summarize, this paper emphasizes that the financial sector is one in which there are large fixed investments in information gathering. Because of the consequent increasing returns to scale, most financial services have elements of natural monopoly associated with them. Regulatory actions in these environments may have very different effects from regulatory actions in more competitive environments.
Allowing banks to enter a business like underwriting because the incumbents in the business enjoy market power may actually reduce the amount of competition in the business, and reduce welfare. Unless regulators understand the forces that create the market power in the first place, their actions may have the opposite consequences to those intended. At the same time, the paper argues that to the extent incumbents in a business compete away most of the rents in that business, there may be little danger in allowing banks to enter it.
I conclude by indulging in a little speculation. It has always puzzled me that the United States which has imposed the strongest strictures on its banks (see Roe (1994) , for a political rationale for these restrictions) has, what is arguably, the economy with the most variety and vitality in its financial markets and institutions.
While I do not want to imply cause and effect (there are many other ways in which the United States differs from other countries), the model should give us pause. Moreover, it seems to me that removing the restrictions on 26 U.S. commercial banks at this point is relatively easy, should have little adverse effect, and potentially some benefit. By contrast, some countries (like Germany and France) have allowed their banks maximum leeway right from the outset. The road that these countries have to travel to improve the transparency and innovativeness of their financial systems seems a lot longer than one the United States has to travel. All this suggests that transition and developing economies should pause a while before embarking on full-fledged universal banking systems. More research is clearly needed to take these thoughts beyond the realm of speculation.
